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Interpersonal misunderstanding is often rooted in noise, or discrepancies between intended and actual
outcomes for an interaction partner due to unintended errors (e.g., not being able to respond to an E-mail
because of a local network breakdown). How can one effectively cope with noise in social dilemmas,
situations in which self-interest and collective interests are conflicting? Consistent with hypotheses, the
present research revealed that incidents of noise exert a detrimental effect on level of cooperation when
a partner follows strict reciprocity (i.e., tit for tat) but that this effect can be overcome if a partner behaves
somewhat more cooperatively than the actor did in the previous interaction (i.e., tit for tat plus 1). Also,
when noise was present, tit for tat plus 1 elicited greater levels of cooperation than did tit for tat, thereby
underscoring the benefits of adding generosity to reciprocity in coping with noise in social dilemmas. The
Discussion outlines implications of the present work for theories focusing on self-presentation and
attribution, communication, and trust and prorelationship behavior.
The study of cooperation continues to intrigue numerous re-
searchers and theorists in the social, behavioral, and biological
sciences who seek answers to fundamental questions regarding the
virtues and vices of various interaction styles. For example, what
are the strengths and limitations of matching a partner’s behavior,
behaving in an eye for an eye fashion? What are the strengths and
limitations of behaving somewhat more cooperatively than one’s
partner? Is there some truth to the saying, “What goes around,
comes around?” Although most people may have their own favor-
ite answer to such basic questions, several theories and models in
the social and behavioral sciences converge to the same piece of
advice: Respond in kind. Concepts such as reciprocal altruism,
exchange, and reciprocity, in particular, tend to underline the
benefits of interacting with others on a quid pro quo basis.
The present research focuses on the benefits of reciprocity
versus generosity in their ability to cope with noise in situations
characterized by a conflict between self-interest and collective
interest (i.e., social dilemmas). Noise is defined as discrepancies
between intended and actual outcomes for an interaction partner
due to unintended errors (e.g., not being able to respond to an
E-mail because of a local network breakdown; Axelrod & Dion,
1988; Bendor, Kramer, & Stout, 1991; Kollock, 1993).1 Incidents
of noise are likely to give rise to misunderstanding (e.g., “He still
has not responded to my E-mail!”), which, in the context of social
dilemmas, may evoke noncooperative rather than cooperative pat-
terns of interaction (e.g., “Next time, I will make him wait as
well”). We suggest that noise is ubiquitous in everyday interac-
tions, given that one’s environment typically is not free of noise
(e.g., a delayed train may cause a person to arrive too late for an
appointment), and eventually everyone is doomed to make a mis-
take by, for example, accidentally doing the wrong thing (e.g.,
taking the wrong exit and therefore arriving too late for an
appointment).
Inspired by recent work on computer simulation, we advance the
central hypothesis that incidents of noise exert detrimental effects
on cooperation and quality of outcomes when a person adopts a
strictly reciprocal strategy and that one can largely overcome such
detrimental effects by adding generosity to reciprocity; that is, by
behaving a little more cooperatively than the other partner did in
the previous interaction. Thus, the major purpose of the present
research is to demonstrate that the detrimental effects of noise can
1 We should note that noise has been defined in terms of both (a)
misimplementation of behavior, or errors on the part of the actor, and (b)
misperception of behavior, or errors on the part of the observer. This
distinction between misimplementation and misperception serves impor-
tant theoretical purposes, and—we believe—could inspire fruitful avenues
of research (for a discussion, see Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Kollock, 1993).
Given the preliminary nature of empirical research on noise, we do not
elaborate on this distinction and define and operationalize noise in terms of
both misimplementation and misperception (i.e., a discrepancy between
intended and actual outcomes that is known to the actor but unknown to the
partner). Also, by defining noise in terms of discrepancies between in-
tended and actual outcome, we do not wish to imply that these intended
outcomes are necessarily a product of conscious or systematic thought. We
assume that intended outcomes may also involve very little or even no
conscious or systematic thought at all (see also Rusbult & Van Lange,
1996).
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be overcome more effectively by behaving a little more coopera-
tively than the partner did rather than behaving in a strictly
reciprocal manner.
Virtues and Vices of Strict Reciprocity
One of the most convincing cases supporting the benefits of
reciprocity has been made in The Evolution of Cooperation (Ax-
elrod, 1984), which provides compelling evidence in support of the
effectiveness of the tit for tat (TFT) strategy in eliciting and
maintaining patterns of cooperative interaction. TFT is a strictly
reciprocal strategy that begins with a cooperative choice and
subsequently imitates the other person’s previous choice. Axel-
rod’s (1984) well-known computer tournament studies revealed
that, relative to alternative strategies that were submitted by sev-
eral experts, TFT elicited greater levels of cooperation from the
social environment and yielded greater outcomes than did any of
the other strategies that were submitted. Both the methodology,
which inspired several important computer simulation studies, and
the general findings had a major impact on theory and research in
several disciplines. TFT was the simplest strategy submitted to the
tournament, and many scientists were quite surprised by its
success.
Why was TFT, as the exemplar of strict reciprocity, the winner
in this tournament? Axelrod (1984) argued that TFT effectively
elicits patterns of mutual cooperation—thereby enhancing the
long-term outcomes for both the actor (who follows TFT) and the
dyad—because of four features. TFT is nice because it never
initiates noncooperation, it is forgiving because it never responds
to a noncooperative choice prior to the last behavior, it is retalia-
tory because it immediately matches the other person’s noncoop-
erative behavior, and it is clear because interdependent others soon
learn the contingencies between their own actions and the subse-
quent matching by TFT. Empirical research using actual partici-
pants has revealed that TFT is among the strategies that are most
effective in eliciting and maintaining cooperation between indi-
viduals (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1995; Pruitt, 1998) and groups,
despite the fact that interactions between groups tend to be sub-
stantially less cooperative and more competitive than are interac-
tions between individuals (Insko et al., 1998). Moreover, TFT is
especially effective in eliciting cooperation from individuals
whose primarily goal is to enhance outcomes for themselves (i.e.,
individualists; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975), and it tends to drive
away those who seek to beat a partner’s outcomes (i.e., competi-
tors; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). Also, compared with some less
reciprocal strategies, TFT is generally judged as being both fair
and intelligent (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr,
1991). Thus, there is good reason to believe that TFT provides an
interaction style (or strategy) that individuals can use fruitfully in
ongoing interactions to elicit and maintain mutual cooperation.
However, TFT is not without limitations. For example, it is not
clear whether the effectiveness of TFT or variants thereof can be
generalized to larger groups, to interdependence structures other
than the prisoner’s dilemma, or to settings in which the number of
interactions is rather limited (Axelrod, 1984; Komorita & Parks,
1995). But, more important, in social environments in which
TFT’s cooperative behavior (e.g., the first choice) is not always
reciprocated, TFT is almost bound to be trapped in a cycle of
noncooperative interactions in which individuals continue to re-
spond noncooperatively to one another’s noncooperative behavior
(e.g., Tetlock, McGuire, & Mitchell, 1991). The only way out of
this pattern of negative reciprocity, or echo effect (Axelrod, 1984),
is that one or both persons initiates cooperation. Because TFT does
not initiate cooperation, it does not actively contribute to breaking
out of the pattern of negative reciprocity; if anything, TFT supports
the echo effect.
Noise and Misunderstanding
What could be the sources of the echo effect? First, an individ-
ual may intentionally make a noncooperative choice. For example,
one might want to get ahead or make absolutely sure that the
partner is not getting ahead and, therefore, make a noncooperative
choice. For example, unlike individuals pursuing joint outcomes or
personal outcomes, individuals with a competitive orientation do
not develop patterns of cooperation with TFT but usually end up in
stable patterns of negative reciprocity (Kuhlman & Marshello,
1975; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). Second, an individual may
unintentionally make a noncooperative choice. That is, there may
be discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes for an
interaction partner because of unintended errors, which we earlier
referred to as noise (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Bendor et al., 1991;
Kollock, 1993; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; cf. trembling hand;
Selten, 1978). For example, a colleague may be ill prepared for a
meeting not because of a lack of motivation but because some
events prevented him or her from preparing well (e.g., the col-
league’s neighbors had a loud party that night).
Although several dimensions have been identified to classify
different types of noise, the distinction between positive noise and
negative noise is directly relevant to understanding the effects of
noise in social dilemmas.2 Positive noise exists when the actual
outcome for the partner is more positive (or less negative) than
intended by the actor. Suppose that after work, Peter goes to a
nearby cafe, intending to drink with his friends and have a good
time. After noticing that none of his friends is there, he goes home
early, to the delight of his wife, who is very grateful. Negative
noise exists when the intended outcome for the partner is less
positive (or more negative) than intended by the actor. Examples
of negative noise come easily to mind—in fact, nearly all of the
examples we have discussed so far are examples of negative noise
(e.g., not responding to an E-mail; not preparing well for a
meeting).
Although both forms of noise can lead to misunderstanding, we
suggest that negative noise rather than positive noise is particularly
likely to give rise to misunderstanding along with reduced levels of
cooperation. Often, the partner (unlike the actor) only has access to
information about the actual outcomes and has no complete knowl-
edge about the outcomes that the actor intended to bring about.
2 As noted by Kollock (1993), one might advance a distinction between
incidents of noise that are (a) internally caused, when an internal but
uncontrollable event prevents an actor from attaining intended outcomes
(e.g., he or she says the wrong thing), or (b) externally caused, when an
external (and uncontrollable) event prevents an actor from making the
intended choice (e.g., the phone line is busy). Such a conceptualization of
noise is congruent with the distinction between the attribution dimensions
of internality (internal vs. external) and controllability (controllable vs.
uncontrollable; Weiner, 1979).
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Given that negative noise implies not so good outcomes for the
partner (at least, worse than intended by the actor), whereas
positive noise implies good outcomes for the partner (at least,
better than intended by the actor), negative noise is likely to have
more impact on perceptions and judgments of the actor’s inten-
tions than positive noise. One reason is that individuals are espe-
cially motivated to form personality impressions and make attri-
butions when their own outcomes are affected in a negative
manner rather than a positive manner (e.g., Kanouse & Hanson,
1971; Weiner, 1985). A complementary reason is that because
individuals tend to depart from globally positive beliefs when
forming impressions and tend to hold positive expectations regard-
ing their own outcomes, another person’s behavior that produces
negative outcomes stands out more and is therefore more salient
than another person’s behavior that produces positive outcomes
(Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; for an
empirical illustration of this negativity effect in social dilemmas,
see De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999). A further reason is that
individuals exhibit a very strong tendency to explain behaviors and
their effects in terms of the actor’s underlying traits and intentions
rather than in terms of the situational variables that may in fact
have produced the behaviors and their effects (cf. fundamental
attribution error; Ross, 1977; correspondence bias; Jones, 1990;
see also Allison & Kerr, 1994). Thus, differing lines of reasoning
indicate that partners are likely to form not so benign impressions
of actors when actors’ choices are affected by negative noise,
whereas impressions should remain benign—or become even
more benign—when actors’ choices are affected by positive noise.
Presumably, the formation of personality impressions serves to
summarize evaluations regarding a partner’s behavior and re-
sponses in past interactions as well as to guide one’s own behavior
and responses in future interactions with this partner (cf. Fiske,
1992; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). Consistent with previous
evidence, we suggest that cooperative behavior is somewhat prob-
able when a partner forms benign impressions of the actor,
whereas noncooperative behavior is very probable when a partner
forms not so benign impressions of the actor (e.g., De Bruin & Van
Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The formation of not
so benign impressions should especially be associated with lower
levels of cooperation, thus yielding a pattern of interaction very
similar to the echo effect that we described earlier. As a case in
point, Wu and Axelrod (1995) describe the case of a South Korean
airliner that mistakenly flew over the Soviet Union and subse-
quently was shot down by the Soviets, killing all 269 people
aboard. Thereafter, echo effects were observed in a short but sharp
escalation of the Cold War tensions (Goldstein, 1991, p. 202).
Thus, noise—especially negative noise—may often have detri-
mental effects such that an actor’s behavior that produces negative
outcomes undermines the partner’s benign impressions of the actor
as well as the partner’s willingness to behave cooperatively, which
eventually may result in continuing cycles of noncooperative in-
teraction (i.e., the echo effect).
How to Overcome the Detrimental Effects of Noise
Previous work that supports the success of TFT is based on
environments in which there is no discrepancy between intended
and actual outcomes. But what if such environments are affected
by noise? What if intended and actual outcomes are not always the
same, as is usually true in real-life interactions? Because TFT
reciprocates an actor’s actual behavior (not an actor’s intended
behavior), the echo effect may fairly rapidly be instigated by
incidents of negative noise. In fact, for two persons following TFT,
even a single incident of negative noise affecting one of the
partners’ behavior may yield an echo effect. Axelrod (1984) ac-
knowledged that it might well be that TFT would fare less well
when one or both persons may have problems implementing their
behavior and when there is uncertainty regarding the other’s in-
tended behavior.
One way of dealing with the echo effect, suggested by Axelrod
(1984, pp. 186–187), is to add generosity to reciprocity by behav-
ing somewhat more cooperatively than the partner. An example of
adding generosity is a modified TFT strategy that cooperates 10%
of the time that it would otherwise not cooperate. Generosity may
not help reduce echo effects when the source of these effects is
intentional, such as in noise-free environments simulated by Ax-
elrod (1984) and used in many empirical studies that support the
effectiveness of TFT (e.g., when the partner is competitive;
Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van
Lange & Visser, 1999). Yet when the source of the echo effect is
unintentional (i.e., due to noise), generosity may in fact be quite
effective in reducing the detrimental consequences of noise. Re-
cently, computer simulations have been conducted to examine the
effects of generosity in coping with noise. These studies reveal that
noise exerts detrimental effects that could be overcome more
effectively by generous versions of TFT than by either strict TFT
(Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Bendor et al., 1991; Kollock, 1993) or a
win–stay, lose–shift strategy that behaves cooperatively unless in
the previous trial either the self or the other was exploited (Wu &
Axelrod, 1995; this is important because the latter strategy, called
Pavlov, has been argued to be superior to TFT; e.g., Nowak &
Sigmund, 1993).
Although the evidence regarding the benefits of generosity and
why generosity may help overcome the detrimental effects of noise
may be compelling, we know of virtually no efforts toward exam-
ining these issues in empirical research using actual participants.
Such efforts complement and extend computer simulations in at
least two major ways. First, the results of computer simulations are
obviously dependent on the strategies that are included in the
simulation, which tend to be variants of reciprocal strategies.
Given that it is not known, at least not with sufficient confidence,
what strategies individuals use in real-world interactions and how
they are shaped by the presence of other strategies, the results of
computer simulations may not be directly relevant to understand-
ing functional strategies in real-world interactions. Indeed, one
cannot rule out the possibility that people adopt strategies that are
somewhat less reciprocal, more generous, or more exploitative
than those included in computer simulations. If, for example,
people tend to adopt exploitative or competitive strategies, gener-
ous versions of TFT may actually elicit lower levels of cooperation
than does strict TFT, perhaps even more so when there is noise.
After all, generosity may invite exploitation, especially if exploit-
ative attempts cannot be perceived as resulting from noise.
Second, although computer simulations are very useful tools for
understanding the logic underlying very complex interaction phe-
nomena, they cannot provide insight into the “psychologic” un-
derlying interaction phenomena. For example, the formation of
benign or not so benign impressions may be affected by the
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presence of noise, which may then help us understand the psycho-
logical mechanisms that support the functionality of generosity
versus reciprocity in noisy situations. Thus, as noted by several
computer simulation researchers, it is essential that simulation
research is complemented and extended by empirical research
(e.g., Bendor et al., 1991; Signorino, 1996).
Research Design and Hypotheses
The present research uses a social dilemma task in which we
focus on the degree of cooperation (rather than the dichotomous
choice involving cooperation or noncooperation) and examine the
effects of negative noise (rather than positive noise) that affected
either both persons’ behavior, only the participant’s choices, or
only the partner’s choices. We discuss each of these features in
turn. To begin with, the present research uses a specific social
dilemma task in which participants had to decide how many coins
to give away to the partner, allowing us to examine the degree of
cooperation. As noted by Kollock (1993), this dilemma addresses
limitations of the classic 2  2 prisoner’s dilemma, which only
allows a dichotomous choice: to cooperate or not cooperate. Ex-
amining a social dilemma that includes different degrees of coop-
eration may serve at least two complementary purposes. First, it is
consistent with several social dilemmas outside of the laboratory
that involve degrees of cooperation (e.g., how well one prepares
for a joint meeting); similarly, noise may also often take a gradual
form rather than an all-or-nothing form (e.g., being less than well
prepared because of external constraints). Second, by examining
degrees of cooperation, actors and partners are able to use strate-
gies by which they can (behaviorally) communicate much more
profoundly (and perhaps more effectively) than in a prisoner’s
dilemma, which involves only a dichotomous choice. Indeed, by
programming the strategy followed by the partner, we compared a
TFT partner, who reciprocated exactly the number of coins that he
or she was given in the previous trial, with a TFT 1 partner, who
gave the participant one more coin than he or she received in the
previous trial (see also Kollock, 1993). The TFT  1 strategy
represents a reciprocal interaction style, complemented by a little
generosity that is communicated at each interaction trial. Adding a
relatively small level of generosity may be adaptive because the
act of generosity involves only relatively minor costs (i.e.,
adding only one coin) and is therefore less vulnerable to at-
tempts toward exploitation than are more generous strategies
(e.g., strategies that add more than one coin at each interaction
trial).
Moreover, the present research examines negative noise rather
than positive noise because we assumed that negative noise may be
relatively more prevalent in real-life interaction situations and
more likely to elicit both (a) misunderstanding (i.e., incidents of
negative noise challenge, benign impressions of the partner)
and (b) continuing cycles of noncooperative interaction (i.e.,
the echo effect). Indeed, a recent computer simulation provided
evidence in support of the notion that negative noise is more
likely than positive noise to elicit the echo effect (Signorino,
1996).
Finally, the present research compares a no-noise condition with
three noise conditions, in which negative noise affected (a) both
persons’ choices, (b) only the participant’s choices, or (c) only the
partner’s choices. These three conditions serve two purposes. A
first purpose is to explore possible differences among the three
noise conditions. We assumed that the detrimental effects of noise
come into being through incidents of negative noise in one of the
person’s choices; as noted earlier, we assumed that it takes only
one person’s noncooperative behavior, intended or unintended, to
evoke noncooperative interaction (i.e., the echo effect). This as-
sumption is derived from the idea that most people behave in a
largely reciprocal manner and that, if they deviate from reciproc-
ity, they tend to do so in a self-serving or self-protective manner
rather than in a generous manner (cf. behavioral assimilation; see
Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre,
1986; Van Lange, 1999). This line of reasoning led us to
anticipate no strong differences among the three conditions
involving noise; hence, we advanced no formal hypothesis
regarding differences among the three conditions involving
negative noise. A second and more important purpose is to
examine the generality of our central hypothesis across the
three conditions involving negative noise. Following our earlier
reasoning, we predicted that, relative to no noise, the three
conditions involving noise would exert a detrimental effect on
cooperation for a TFT partner; this detrimental effect should be
less pronounced for a TFT  1 partner.
The central hypothesis is that noise exerts detrimental effects on
level of cooperation when a partner follows TFT, whereas these
effects are less pronounced when a partner follows the more
generous version of TFT, referred to as TFT  1. We also
hypothesized that under conditions of no noise, TFT and TFT  1
might elicit comparable levels of cooperation, but that under
conditions of negative noise, TFT  1 is likely to elicit greater
levels of cooperation than TFT. Indeed, evidence in support of this
latter hypothesis suggests the benefits of generosity.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
Two hundred five participants (65 men, 140 women) with an average
age of 21 years took part in the present research. Each participant was
paid 15 Dutch guilders in exchange for participation (NFL 15.00 equals
about $6 in American currency). The experimental design was a 2
(partner’s strategy: TFT vs. TFT  1)  4 (noise: absent, present in
both persons’ choices, present in only the participant’s choice, or
present in only the partner’s choice)  9 (blocks of trials) analysis of
variance, with the latter variable a within-subject variable (this variable
is discussed shortly). The primary dependent variable was level of
(intended) cooperation.
Procedure
Eight to 15 participants attended each research session. On arrival, each
participant was greeted and escorted to 1 of 15 cubicles, which prevented
participants from communicating with each other. The entire experiment
was conducted with Apple Macintosch computers, using a program written
in Authorware Professional.
The social dilemma task. The instructions for the experimental task
began by explaining the social dilemma task. This task offered the partic-
ipant a choice among 11 options, varying systematically from least to most
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cooperative (see also Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).3
The social dilemma was presented as a give-some situation in which each
participant could choose among giving no coins, giving 1 coin, giving 2
coins, up to maximally giving 10 coins to the other. Each coin held by the
participant had a value of NFL 0.50 to the participant and a value of
NFL 1.00 to the partner. Similarly, each coin held by the partner had a
value of NFL 0.50 to the partner and a value of NFL 1.00 to the participant.
The situation represents a social dilemma in that (a) each individual obtains
greater outcomes to the extent that he or she gives fewer coins away (i.e.,
individual rationality) and (b) both individuals end up with greater out-
comes to the extent that they simultaneously give more coins to each other
(i.e., collective rationality; for more information regarding a similar social
dilemma task, see Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The
total set of 121 possible outcomes to each person was presented to the
participant in the form of an 11  11 matrix, which was presented on a
sheet of paper that participants could consult throughout the social di-
lemma task.
The number of coins and the consequences of giving away coins were
displayed on the participant’s computer screen. As can be seen in Figure 1
(Panel A), the participant faced a virtual table, divided into the participant’s
side, on which 10 green coins for the participants were displayed (i.e.,
“you”), and the partner’s side, on which 10 blue coins for the partner were
displayed (i.e., “the other”). The consequences of the participant’s own
choices and the consequences of the partner’s choices for the participant’s
number of coins and the partner’s number of coins were displayed through
animated graphics. As can be inferred from Figure 1 (i.e., indicated in
Panel B), the coins that were given away by the participant literally moved
from the participant’s side to the partner’s side of the table, and vice versa
for the coins given away by the partner. The outcomes with which the
participant and the partner proceeded (Figure 1, Panel A) and ended an
interaction trial (Figure 1, Panel B) were displayed at the right of the table.
Finally, throughout the interactions, we used variable time intervals for
displaying the number of coins given by the partner to mimic the variability
in decision time that characterizes the choices of real people in social
dilemmas.
The social dilemma task included nine equivalent blocks of 6 trials,
except for the ninth block, which included 5 trials (as we describe shortly).
Participants were not informed about the total number of 53 trials but were
informed that before proceeding to the next trial they would receive
information about the partner’s choice (and the partner would receive
information about the participant’s choice). After explaining the social
dilemma task, we administered 10 questions to check the participants’
comprehension of the task. It appeared that 10 participants answered four
or more questions incorrectly; hence, the data of these participants were not
included in the analyses (i.e., the same criterion was used in previous
research; e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).
The outcomes in the social dilemma task were presented in Dutch
guilders (see Figure 1). As in previous experiments (e.g., Van Lange, 1999;
Van Lange & Visser, 1999), we informed participants that the amount of
money was hypothetical but that by earning more money they would
increase their chances of winning a 25-guilder book certificate (i.e., a gift
certificate for buying books at any bookstore in the Netherlands).4 That is,
we stated that the amount of hypothetical money earned for themselves
corresponded to the number of tickets in a raffle for the book certificates,
making clear that their chances would increase by the amount of money
they earned for themselves during the task, not by the amount of money
they earned more than the other participants in this experiment. We used an
absolute standard, and the number of certificates was not fixed, to prevent
participants from thinking that outperforming others is needed to gain the
book certificate (for identical procedure, see Van Lange & Visser, 1999).
(In the actual raffle, held after the entire experiment was completed, each
participant had an equal chance of winning the book certificate).
Manipulation of partner’s strategy. Both the TFT partner and the
TFT  1 partner were programmed to begin by giving 6 coins, a moder-
ately cooperative choice. These partners did not begin with giving 10 coins
because selecting the most cooperative choice of the 11 options is rather
unrealistic (in fact, even in a 4-coin paradigm used in earlier research (Van
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2001), we observed that only 6% of the
3 Prior to this study, we conducted our first study on noise in social
dilemmas (Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2001). In this study, we
manipulated both positive noise and negative noise and used a 4-coin
paradigm in which participants had to decide among five options: giving no
coins, 1 coin, 2 coins, 3 coins, or 4 coins to the other. The instructions for
the present study, which uses a 10-coin paradigm, were virtually identical
to this earlier research. However, we designed a 10-coin paradigm because
we anticipated that participants would be less likely to give the maximum
number of coins (so that TFT  1 does not come through) or no coins at
all (so that negative noise does not come through) when they have 11
options rather than 5 options.
4 We attempted the use hypothetical amounts of money that were neither
too small nor too large so that participants could easily imagine that they
would indeed give and receive such benefits (i.e., that they acted as if it
were real money). It should be clear that the experiment would be very
costly if we were to pay participants according to outcomes given in the
matrix (i.e., it would amount to NFL 530.00 per participant per hour, if all
interactions were maximally cooperative).
Figure 1. The virtual table displaying the number of coins with which
participants proceeded an interaction trial (Panel A) and ended an interac-
tion trial (Panel B) in the social dilemma task.
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participants began with giving all 4 coins to the partner, whereas a majority
of 71% gave 1 coin or 2 coins). However, consistent with the conceptual
definition of TFT (and TFT  1), we wanted these partners to be at least
moderately nice, so we decided that both partners’ first choice was mod-
erately cooperative (i.e., giving 6 of 10 coins). We acknowledge that this
choice is somewhat arbitrary, and it would be interesting for future research
to explore variations in initial niceness, because the very first behavior may
exert important influences on subsequent interactions (see Komorita &
Parks, 1995).
In subsequent trials, TFT was programmed to give exactly the same
number of coins that the participant gave it in the previous interaction trial,
and TFT  1 was programmed to give 1 more coin than the participant
gave it in the previous interaction trial. Thus, in this 10-coin paradigm, the
TFT  1 partner adds 1 coin from 10 coins in total to the participant’s
previous choice. Finally, as noted earlier, the TFT  1 partner cannot add
a coin if it received the maximum number of 10 coins from the participant
in the previous interaction trial. It appeared that, on average, participants
actually gave 10 coins in nearly 16 of 53 trials (M 15.81), indicating that
the TFT  1 partner actually gave 1 more coin than it received in 70.2%
of the interactions.5
Manipulation of noise. Prior to making choices in the social dilemma
task, participants in the three noise conditions were told that we were
interested in examining how people make decisions in “situations in which
the actual decision(s) by both persons [one person] may every now and
then be different from the decision(s) one intends to make.” We reasoned
that an incident of noise would very likely be attributed to the partner’s
intended behavior if participants were told nothing about the possibility of
noise in the experimental laboratory (i.e., there is no reason for participants
to believe that the experimenter will change their choice). Also, the
instructions emphasized that although the actor would receive information
when his or her choice was changed, the partner would not be informed
about a change in the actor’s intended choice. The incidents of noise were
also illustrated by an example so that the participants could see how the
computer might change a decision and how the computer would inform the
actor about such changes. Obviously, these instructions were not included
in the no-noise condition. Thus, in the noise conditions, we aimed to
establish a basic understanding of noise and a realization that choices made
by the participant and the partner would be changed every now and then.
Presumably, this is consistent with real-life interactions, such that people
understand noise and often are aware that situations may be somewhat
noisy (e.g., when another person does not respond to an E-mail, one does
take into account that the other might not have received the E-mail; cf.
Weiner, 1985). We note that throughout the instructions, we did not use
value-laden words such as misunderstanding or errors to prevent tenden-
cies toward reactivity. Subsequently, in the conditions in which noise every
now and then influenced both persons’ choices, the participant’s choices,
or the partner’s choices, participants were informed about the possibility of
noise, learning that the computer would change in some trials both persons’
choices, only their own choices (and not the other’s choices), or only the
other’s choices (and not their own choices).
As noted earlier, the social dilemma task included 53 interaction trials,
consisting of eight structurally equivalent blocks of trials, in that each
block included 5 normal interaction trials plus 1 interaction trial involving
noise. Block 1 included the first 6 trials, with the 6th trial involving noise;
Block 2 included Trials 7–12, with the 12th trial involving noise; and so on.
The final block of trials, Block 9, included only 5 normal interaction trials.
This block did not end with a trial involving noise, because this trial could
not affect subsequent levels of cooperation.
In each of three noise conditions (i.e., noise–both, noise–participant,
noise–partner), the choices in 8 interaction trials were influenced by noise,
thus holding constant the total frequency of noise across the three condi-
tions (noise frequency  15%; 8 of 53 trials). Also, in each of the three
noise conditions, we operationalized negative noise by subtracting two
coins from the intended choice. We subtracted two coins so as to induce a
reasonable noise intensity that was unlikely to go by unnoticed. Finally, in
the condition in which noise affected both persons’ choices, the incidents
of negative noise alternated, beginning with noise affecting the partici-
pant’s choice (6th trial), followed by noise affecting the partner’s choice
(12th trial), and so on.
Obviously, when the participant or partner intends to give no coins,
incidents of negative noise in reality do not affect that choice. As noted
earlier, we anticipated that in the 10-coin paradigm noise would be more
likely to come through than in a paradigm involving fewer options (e.g., a
4-coin paradigm, which we have used in previous research). As expected,
the number of times noise came through was very high in the noise–both
condition (M  7.33), in the noise–participant condition (M  7.26), and
in the noise–partner condition (M  7.58); moreover, a one-way analysis
of variance revealed no significant differences among these three condi-
tions, F(2, 137)  1.22, ns. Thus, although noise did not come through all
the time, it did so most of the time (i.e., in more than 7 of 8 incidents of
noise, on average).
After the social dilemma task, we asked in the three noise conditions
whether the computer had changed both persons’ intended choices, the
participant’s intended choices, or the partner’s intended choices. It ap-
peared that 10 participants answered this question incorrectly. The data of
these participants and 1 participant who exhibited suspicion during the
social dilemma task were excluded from the analyses, leaving a total of 184
participants.
On completion of the social dilemma task, participants proceeded with
a postexperimental questionnaire. This questionnaire included eight items
assessing benign impressions of the partner. The scale included positive
items and negative items. Positive items were “The other was . . . generous,
nice, forgiving, kind,” and negative items were “The other was . . . selfish,
greedy, competitive, stingy” (Cronbach’s   .87). After the postexperi-
mental questionnaire, participants were debriefed, thanked for their partic-
ipation, and paid.
Results
As noted earlier, the social dilemma task involved 53 trials,
consisting of eight equivalent blocks of 5 trials without noise and 1
trial with noise and a ninth block of only 5 trials. Level of
cooperation was analyzed in a 2 (partner’s strategy: TFT vs.
TFT  1)  4 (noise: absent, present in both persons’ choices,
only present in the participant’s choices, or only present in the
partner’s choices)  9 (blocks of trials) analysis of variance, with
the latter variable a within-subject variable.6 Because we hypoth-
5 It is of some interest to note that this overall percentage is virtually
identical to the overall percentage observed in an earlier experiment
conducted by us (Van Lange et al., 2001). Further, it is not surprising that
this percentage was lower for the no-noise condition (39.6%) than for the
noise conditions (78.4% in the noise–both condition, 74.3% in the noise–
participant condition, and 88.9% in the noise–partner condition; contrast of
noise vs. no noise, F[1, 85]  30.19, p  .01). Differences among these
percentages within the noise conditions were not significant. Generally,
these findings are not surprising because, as outlined earlier, the presence
of negative noise should exert detrimental effects on level of cooperation,
including the frequency of maximal cooperation.
6 We also assessed the mean quality of outcomes that the partner
obtained (i.e., quality of partner’s outcomes) and the mean quality of
outcomes that the participant and the partner obtained together (i.e., quality
of collective outcomes). These two measures correspond to individual-
level and group-level functionality (cf. Sober & Wilson, 1998). Correla-
tional analyses revealed that the level of cooperation was very highly
correlated with the quality of the partner’s outcomes, r(184) .98, and the
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esized that the absence of noise condition would differ from the
three conditions involving noise (in both persons’ choices, partic-
ipant’s choices, or partner’s choices), we computed three orthog-
onal contrasts. The most important contrast compares the noise-
absent condition with the three noise-present conditions, which we
refer to as the noise-versus-no-noise contrast. The other two con-
trasts were used to explore possible differences among the three
noise-present conditions: (a) a contrast comparing the noise in both
persons’ choices condition with the noise in participants’ choices
condition and the noise in partner’s choices condition (i.e., a
both-vs.-single contrast), and (b) a contrast between the noise in
participant’s choices condition versus the noise in partner’s
choices condition (i.e., a self-vs.-other contrast). Because the latter
two contrasts were not directly hypothesis relevant and because
they generally exerted no significant effects, these contrasts are
only discussed if they exert significant effects.
Level of Cooperation
A 2 (partner’s strategy)  4 (noise)  9 (blocks of trials)
analysis of variance revealed a main effect for partner’s strategy,
F(1, 176)  6.30, p  .05, indicating that across the four noise
conditions, the TFT  1 partner (M  6.60) elicited greater
cooperation than did the TFT partner (M  5.72). The analysis
also yielded a significant main effect for noise, F(3, 176)  4.14,
p  .01. Complementary analyses revealed a significant noise-
versus-no-noise contrast, F(1, 176)  10.84, p  .001, indicating
greater levels of cooperation when noise was absent (M  7.20)
than when noise was present, irrespective of whether the noise
affected both persons’ choices (M  6.00), only the participant’s
choices (M  6.04), or only the partner’s choices (M  5.50).
Thus, noise exhibited a detrimental effect on level of cooperation.
More important, these main effects were qualified by an inter-
action of partner’s strategy and noise, F(1, 176)  2.73, p  .05.
The means relevant to this interaction are summarized in Table 1
(see the level of cooperation data). Planned comparisons revealed
a significant interaction of partner’s strategy and the noise-versus-
no-noise contrast, F(1, 176)  7.74, p  .01. As can be seen in
Figure 2, a TFT partner elicited high levels of cooperation under
no noise and relatively low levels of cooperation when noise was
present. Indeed, simple main effects analyses within the TFT
condition revealed a main effect of noise, F(3, 176)  6.52, p 
.01, as well as a significant effect of the noise-versus-no-noise
contrast, F(1, 176)  18.30, p  .01. However, for a TFT  1
partner, the level of cooperation was not significantly affected by
the presence versus absence of noise; indeed, the simple main
effects analyses within TFT  1 revealed neither a significant
main effect of noise, F(3, 176)  0.19, ns, nor a significant effect
of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast, F(1, 176)  0.09, ns.
The significant interaction of the partner’s strategy and the
noise-versus-no-noise contrast can also be interpreted in terms of
the relative performance of TFT and TFT  1 partners through an
examination of whether TFT  1 might actually elicit greater
cooperation than TFT when choices are affected by noise. Within
the no-noise condition, a TFT partner and a TFT  1 partner did
not significantly differ in terms of the level of cooperation they
elicited, F(1, 176)  1.39, ns. However, within the three condi-
tions, we found that a TFT  1 partner elicited significantly
greater levels of cooperation than did a TFT partner, F(1,
176) 11.06, p .01. (Contrasts within the three noise conditions
were not significant.)
Thus, consistent with our central hypothesis, noise exhibited a
detrimental effect on level of cooperation in interactions with a
TFT partner but not in interactions with a TFT 1 partner. Moreover,
in support of the benefits of generosity, when noise affected the
participant’s choices, the partner’s choices, or both persons’ choices,
TFT  1 elicited greater levels of cooperation than did TFT.7
Finally, the analysis revealed two effects involving blocks of
trials. First, there was a main effect for blocks of trials on level of
cooperation, F(8, 169)  16.61, p  .01, indicating that level of
cooperation increased gradually over the first five blocks
(Ms  4.56, 5.25, 5.79, 6.19, and 6.58 in Blocks 1–5, respec-
tively), after which increases were somewhat less pronounced
7 We should note that the results were very similar in analyses that
included participants who were excluded in the analyses described above.
For example, the interaction of the partner’s strategy and the noise-versus-
no-noise contrast was significant in all analyses that included participants
failing the comprehension check, participants failing the the manipulation
check, the participant who exhibited suspicion, or all three groups (i.e., all
participants).
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Level of Cooperation and
Benign Impressions as a Function of Partner’s Strategy
and Noise
Partner’s strategy
Noise
Absent
Both
persons
Participant’s
choices
Partner’s
choices
Level of cooperation
TFT
M 7.63 5.15 5.47 4.60
SD 2.02 2.53 2.48 2.24
TFT  1
M 6.77 6.81 6.57 6.30
SD 2.43 2.33 2.70 2.50
Benign impressions
TFT
M 5.04 3.76 4.36 4.34
SD 0.95 1.14 1.08 1.08
TFT  1
M 5.74 5.57 5.92 5.33
SD 0.86 0.82 0.68 0.93
Note. TFT  tit for tat; TFT  1  giving one more coin than the other
gave in the previous interaction.
quality of collective outcomes, r(184)  .99, and the latter variables were
also highly correlated, r(184)  .97. Quality of partner outcomes and
quality of collective outcomes yielded exactly the same findings as for
level of cooperation. The only exception was that for the partner’s out-
comes, the analysis did not reveal a main effect of the partner’s strategy,
F(1, 176)  0.35, ns. The outcomes for a TFT partner (M  7.86) were
indeed similar for the outcomes for a TFT  1 partner (M  7.97). As for
level of cooperation, quality of collective outcomes was greater when the
partner followed TFT  1 (M  16.77) rather than TFT (M  15.58), as
evidenced by a main effect of partner’s strategy, F(1, 176)  12.65,
p  .01.
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(Ms  6.70, 6.72, 6.89, and 6.92 in Blocks 6–9, respectively).
Second, the analysis revealed an interaction of noise and blocks of
trials, F(24, 513)  2.21, p  .01. Complementary analyses
revealed a significant interaction of the noise-versus-no-noise con-
trast with blocks of trials, F(8, 169)  2.95, p  .01. There was a
stronger increase in cooperation when noise was absent (from
M  4.49 in Block 1 to M  8.31 in Block 9; a mean increase of
M  3.82) than when noise was present, either in both persons’
choices (from M 4.90 in Block 1 to M 6.34 in Block 9; a mean
increase of M 1.44), in the participant’s choices (from M 4.33
in Block 1 to M  7.08 in Block 9; a mean increase of M  2.75),
or in the partner’s choices (from M 4.54 in Block 1 to M 5.97
in Block 9; a mean increase of M 1.43).8 These findings provide
evidence for the notion that the detrimental effects of noise are
interaction based. That is, when there is no noise, there is an
increase in cooperation over successive interactions (at least in the
context of TFT and TFT  1 strategies). Thus, the presence of
noise seems to inhibit learning over successive interactions.9
Benign Impressions
A 2 (partner’s strategy)  4 (noise) analysis of variance on
benign impressions revealed effects that were similar to those
observed for level of cooperation. First, a main effect of partner’s
strategy, F(1, 176)  81.78, p  .01, revealed that participants
formed more benign impressions of a TFT 1 partner (M 5.65)
than of a TFT partner (M  4.37). The analysis also revealed a
main effect of noise, F(3, 176)  5.21, p  .01. Complementary
analyses revealed a significant effect for the noise-versus-no-noise
contrast, F(1, 176)  9.33, p  .01, indicating more benign
impressions when noise was absent (M  5.39) than when noise
was present, affecting either both persons’ choices (M  4.68),
only the participant’s choices (M  5.17), or only the partner’s
choices (M  4.87).
The analysis also revealed an interaction of partner’s strategy
and noise, F(3, 176) 3.26, p .05, and complementary analyses
revealed a significant effect for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast,
F(1, 176)  5.40, p  .05. Parallelling an earlier noted effect for
level of cooperation, participants formed more benign impressions
of a TFT partner under no noise than under noise (see Table 1
under the Benign impressions subheading). In contrast, partici-
pants formed benign impressions of a TFT  1 partner, and these
impressions were relatively unaffected by the presence or absence
of noise. Simple main effects within TFT revealed a significant
main effect for noise, F(3, 176)  6.78, p  .01, and a significant
effect for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast, F(1, 176)  14.78, p
 .01. Within TFT 1, neither the main effect of noise, F(3, 176)
 1.99, ns, nor the effect of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast,
F(1, 176)  0.06, ns, was significant. Thus, impressions of the
TFT partner were less benign under noise than under no noise,
whereas impressions of a TFT  1 partner were not affected by
noise.
Mediation by Benign Impressions
Is there evidence that benign impressions might mediate the
effects observed for level of cooperation? At the outset, we should
note that, conceptually, benign impressions should both (a) sum-
marize the evaluations of past behavior and interactions and (b)
guide behavior and interactions in future trials. However, benign
impressions were only assessed after the social dilemma task
because we did not want the measurement of impressions to affect
behavior and interaction in the social dilemma task. From the
perspective of testing mediation, this order of measurement can
only yield very preliminary evidence because we assessed the
presumed mediator (i.e., benign impressions) after measuring the
criterion variable (i.e., level of cooperation).
Nevertheless, these analyses reveal some interesting patterns.
First, benign impressions exhibited a significant correlation with
level of cooperation,   .39, p  .01. Given that the main effects
of the partner’s strategy and noise (and the noise-vs.-no-noise
contrast) as well as their interaction (including the interaction
involving the noise-vs.-no-noise contrast) were significant for both
8 It is, of course, interesting to examine whether the interaction of the
partner’s strategy and noise, revealing support for our central hypothesis
(i.e., TFT suffering more from noise than TFT  1), is further shaped by
blocks of trials. The analyses revealed a marginal three-way interaction of
partner’s strategy, noise, and blocks of trials, F(24, 513)  1.45, p  .10.
Complementary analyses revealed evidence (albeit weak) for an interaction
of partner’s strategy, the noise-versus-no-noise contrast, and blocks of
trials, F(8, 169)  2.08, p  .10. We briefly note that the patterns
associated with these effects indicate that our support for the central
hypothesis was established in the third block of trials, as evidenced by an
interaction of strategy and the noise-versus-no-noise contrast in Block 3,
F(1, 176)  4.21, p  .05. This interaction was absent in Block 1, F(1,
176)  0.52, ns, and failed to be significant in Block 2, F(1, 176)  2.55,
p  .11, but was consistently significant in Blocks 4–9 (except for a
marginal interaction effect in Block 4). Taken together, these findings
suggest that even a few incidents of negative noise (in this case, two
incidents) may exert a detrimental effect on the level of cooperation
elicited by a TFT partner, whereas it had no effect on the level of
cooperation elicited by a TFT  1 partner.
9 We also observed a significant interaction between the self-versus-
other contrast and the block of trials, F(8, 169)  2.25, p  .05, indicating
a somewhat stronger increase in cooperation when the participant’s choices
(from M  4.33 in Block 1 to M  7.08 in Block 9) rather than the
partner’s choices were affected by noise (from M  4.54 in Block 1 to
M  5.97 in Block 9). The interaction between both-versus-single contrast
and block of trials was not significant.
Figure 2. Mean levels of cooperation elicited by a TFT partner and a
TFT  1 partner under no noise and three noise conditions, with noise
affecting both persons’ choices, only the participant’s choices, or only the
partner’s choices. TFT  tit for tat; TFT  1  giving one more coin than
the other gave in the previous interaction.
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level of cooperation and benign impressions and given that there
was a positive association between these two variables, we con-
ducted a 2 (partner’s strategy)  4 (noise) analysis of variance,
adding benign impressions as a covariate. In addition to a signif-
icant effect for the covariate, F(1, 175)  30.96, p  .01, this
analysis revealed that the main effect of partner’s strategy dropped
to nonsignificance, F(1, 175)  0.79, ns; (without covariate: F[1,
176]  6.30, p  .05; a significant reduction, Z  4.67, p  .01).
The main effect of noise was now marginal, F(3, 175) 2.45, p
.10 (without covariate: F[3, 176]  4.14, p  .01; a significant
reduction, Z  2.50, p  .01); the noise-versus-no-noise contrast
remained significant, F(1, 175) 4.94, p .05 (without covariate:
F[1, 176]  10.84, p  .01), but was significantly reduced
(Z  2.61, p  .01). Finally, the interaction of partner’s strategy
and noise dropped to nonsignificance, F(3, 175)  1.92, p  .13
(without covariate: F[3, 176]  2.73, p  .05; a significant
reduction, Z  2.05, p  .05), and the interaction of partner’s
strategy and the noise-versus-no-noise contrast remained signifi-
cant, F(1, 175)  4.02, p  .05 (without covariate: F[1, 176]
 7.74, p  .01), but was significantly reduced (Z  2.14,
p  .05).10
Thus, the findings reveal some preliminary evidence indicating
that benign impressions mediated the main effect of partner’s
strategy, the effects of noise (vs. no noise), and the interaction of
noise (vs. no noise) with partner’s strategy on level of cooperation.
As to the latter effects, participants may have exhibited lower
cooperation under noise than under no noise because they formed
less benign impressions of the partner under noise than under no
noise—a TFT  1 partner seems to be able to overcome such
detrimental effects of noise on both level of cooperation and
benign impressions.
Discussion
The present research provides evidence in support of the central
hypothesis that adding generosity to reciprocity helps overcome
the detrimental effect of noise on cooperation in social dilemmas.
Specifically, results reveal that noise exerted a detrimental effect
on level of cooperation when the partner followed TFT and that
this detrimental effect was significantly less pronounced (in fact,
virtually absent) when the partner followed a slightly more gen-
erous version of TFT, which we refer to as TFT  1. Also, in
support of the benefits of generosity, results reveal that under three
conditions of negative noise, TFT  1 elicited greater levels of
cooperation than did TFT. Finally, it is also noteworthy that
participants formed not so benign impressions of a TFT partner
when there was negative noise (vs. no negative noise), whereas
their impressions of the TFT  1 partner were not significantly
affected by negative noise. In the following, we discuss the major
findings, consider some of their implications, and outline some
strengths and limitations of the present research.11 We begin by
addressing explanations of the present findings.
Why Generosity Helps Overcome the Detrimental Effect
of Noise
In addressing this basic question, it is important to note that the
present findings are consistent with several computer simulations,
including Kollock’s (1993) simulation study, which compared
TFT with several other strategies, including TFT  1. This con-
sistency in findings may well be understood in terms of features of
the created social environment with which strategies interact in
computer simulations (i.e., the strategies that are included in the
simulation) as well as features of the actual social environment
with which strategies interact in the laboratory (i.e., the strategies
followed by the participants). That is, the computer simulations
generally include several variants of reciprocity (e.g., Bendor et
al., 1991; Kollock, 1993; Reeves & Pitts, 1996), presumably in
part because of Axelrod’s (1984) original tournament supporting
TFT’s success (in noise-free situations) and in part because of the
widely held belief in the functionality (and evolutionary strengths)
of reciprocity. We suggest that, as do most strategies included in
simulation studies, actual participants involved in iterated social
dilemmas also tend to behave in a fairly reciprocal manner, often
yielding interactions in which both cooperate or neither cooperates
(e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; for reviews, see Komorita &
Parks, 1995; Pruitt, 1998). Such high levels of reciprocity could to
some degree be understood in terms of tendencies toward enhanc-
ing equality in outcomes, which appears to be a pronounced
motivation with which individuals approach and interact with
others in social dilemmas and related interdependence situations
(e.g., Messick & Sentis, 1985; Van Lange, 1999).
In the context of this environment, noise should exert detrimen-
tal effects when the partner follows TFT because neither the
partner nor the participant may be especially inclined to rebuild
trust and communicate benign intent after incidents of negative
noise. That is, after negative noise, two persons who follow largely
reciprocal strategies (without adding generosity) will pull each
other in the direction of less cooperation: As noted in the intro-
duction, for two persons following TFT, only one incident of
negative noise may yield a continuing echo effect. In support of
such reasoning, the present findings reveal that, with a TFT part-
ner, it takes just one incident of noise to exert detrimental effects
on level of cooperation, or, more precisely, to exert inhibiting
effects on increased cooperation over interaction trials. In contrast,
a TFT  1 partner communicates at each interaction trial (except
those affected by noise) benign intent by giving away just a bit
more than it received from the participant in the previous trial.
Presumably, a TFT  1 partner communicates trust and benign
intent, thereby contributing to an interpersonal atmosphere in
which occasional errors matter less than they do in an atmosphere
created by TFT (i.e., the building of trust). Moreover, each time a
10 The significance of the reductions in the effects of the main effects
and interaction effect on level of cooperation was tested using a regression
approach (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) using the formula discussed
at http://nw3.nai.net/dakenny/mediate.htm
11 In our first study on noise in social dilemmas, we simultaneously
manipulated positive noise and negative noise (i.e., four incidents of
positive noise and four incidents of negative noise in both persons’
choices) and used a four-coin paradigm (Van Lange et al., 2001). This
experiment revealed similar results in that the presence of noise exhibited
detrimental effects on level of cooperation, but only with a TFT partner,
not with a TFT 1 partner. This experiment did not reveal that under noise
TFT  1 elicited greater levels of cooperation than did TFT (although
TFT  1 yielded greater collective outcomes under noise than did TFT).
Perhaps the presence of positive noise may make the benefits of generosity
somewhat weaker.
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participant’s beliefs of trust and benign intent are challenged
because of negative noise, a TFT  1 partner restores such beliefs
by behaving generously, eventually pulling most participants (i.e.,
those who follow reciprocal strategies) into the direction of more
rather than less cooperation (i.e., the restoring of trust).
Also, consistent with the above line of reasoning, the present
research reveals that participants developed much less benign
impressions of a TFT partner under negative noise than under no
negative noise, whereas the impressions of a TFT 1 partner were
very benign, irrespective of the presence of negative noise. Medi-
ation analysis provides some preliminary evidence in support of
partial mediation (the evidence is preliminary for reasons outlined
earlier). Thus, we suggest that our measure of benign impressions
supports the line of reasoning that focuses on beliefs of trust and
benign intent that are challenged by negative noise and are over-
come by adding a bit of generosity to TFT. A complementary
advantage of TFT  1 is that because it gives 1 more coin than it
received, it logically confronts the participant with a violation of
fairness (e.g., “I owe this person”). Moreover, it does so at each
interaction at only a small cost (e.g., adding only 1 coin in the
10-coin paradigm), so that the possibilities of exploitation are
similarly small. In the perception of the participant, this recurring
violation of fairness can only be restored, at least behaviorally, if
the participant starts to behave more cooperatively as well (up to
the level of giving the maximal number of coins).
We should briefly comment on the fact that the present findings
are very similar to the findings obtained by computer simulations
by Kollock (1993). In light of this consistency and the fact that
computers do not form impressions, one might ask: How can the
findings regarding benign impressions contribute to an explanation
of the present findings? In addressing this question, it may be
argued that computer simulations provide insight into the logic
underlying the effectiveness of particular interaction styles, in that
they may provide “demonstrations that certain qualitative effects
can be produced by simple sets of idealized assumptions” (Hastie
& Stasser, 2000, p. 88). As a general point, we suggest that the
psychology examined in empirical studies may to some degree
follow from (or support) the logic that is demonstrated in computer
simulations. To illustrate, recent computer simulations have re-
vealed that the functional value of generosity decreases with
increasing group size—in fact, when group size exceeds seven or
eight people, it tends to become functional to behave in a self-
serving manner (Gallucci, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2001). It is
possible that, after repeated interactions with groups of different
sizes, individuals at some level detect this logic, which in turn may
activate several psychological mechanisms, such as decreases in
identification, perceived self-efficacy, or identifiability, that sup-
port a decline in generous and cooperative behavior in larger
groups (e.g., Kerr, 1989; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Van Lange,
Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992).
As for the present findings, individuals’ functioning may have
evolved in such a manner that they may readily develop negative
impressions of others who unintentionally (or intentionally) be-
have less cooperatively than the individuals themselves and sub-
sequently reciprocate that reduced level of cooperation. The latter
effect is often observed in computer simulations, whereas the
former effect reflects a psychological mechanism that supports the
decline in cooperation with a TFT partner among real people. In
the same way, participants may maintain benign impressions of a
TFT 1 partner because this partner contributes to the building of
trust and, after an incident of noise, to the restoring of trust.
Therefore, findings of computer simulations and empirical re-
search tend to go hand in hand, complementing each other in ways
that may provide a more comprehensive account of the strengths
and limitations of reciprocity and generosity.
Boundaries of Generosity
Is adding generosity to reciprocity always effective in coping
with noise? We would like to draw attention to three boundaries of
generosity. First, as have nearly all computer simulations, the
present research uses the social dilemma as a situation in which to
examine the benefits of generosity in coping with noise. Clearly,
the social dilemma represents just one interdependence structure,
characterized by a fairly strong conflict of interest (i.e., moderate
to strong levels of noncorrespondence; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
Generosity is unlikely to work when the dilemma takes the form of
a coordination situation in which outcomes are largely correspond-
ing rather than conflicting. For example, some individuals may
exhibit tendencies toward exchanging more and more expensive
gifts (even though they both want to avoid that), up to the point
that one or both persons can no longer afford such exchanges. In
such situations, there are no benefits attached to generosity, be-
cause by exhibiting seemingly generous behavior, the individuals
pull each other in a direction that they both do not desire. We
suggest that the benefits of generosity may be most pronounced
when that which is given to the other is more valuable to the
recipient than to the giver; these tend to be exchange situations
with moderate levels of noncorrespondence. In discussing the
origins of trust, Kelley and Thibaut (1978), noted that “it is in the
middle regions of the continuum of outcome correspondence, in
which elements of both conflict and cooperation are present as
temptations, that attributions of trust have their origins” (p. 237).
Likewise, we suggest that the effects of negative noise and the
effectiveness of generosity may be most pronounced in the middle
regions of the continuum of outcome correspondence. Future re-
search may examine these issues in structures neighboring the
prisoner’s dilemma.
Second, we suggest that generosity works only when the fre-
quency of noise is not too overwhelming. When the frequency of
noise is so high that it becomes nearly impossible to communicate
trust and benign intent, one might just as well simply pursue direct
self-interest. Computer simulations suggest that when situations
are very noisy (e.g., noise in every other trial or more), a self-
centered version of reciprocity (TFT  1) becomes more func-
tional than TFT or TFT  1 (see Kollock, 1993). Thus, for
generosity to work, there must be an environment that is not too
noisy, so that trust and benign intent can still be communicated.
Future research could assess the functionality of generosity, reci-
procity, and, perhaps, stinginess under various levels of noise.
Finally, even in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma and even
when the amount of noise is not too large, the benefits of gener-
osity are dependent on the social environment. For example,
generosity will be exploited and is unlikely to cope well with noise
if the social environment primarily consists of individuals who
seek to enhance relative advantage over others; that is, when
competitive motivation prevails. As such, it may be risky to
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behave generously in contexts in which competitive motivation is
quite pronounced (e.g., intergroup interaction; Insko et al., 1998).
Implications of Noise and Misunderstanding
Given that noise and misunderstanding have received very little
attention in the social–psychological literature, it is useful to
outline some theoretical implications of the present research, the
concept of noise in particular. First, it should be clear that we
regard noise in social dilemmas as intimately linked with the
interpersonal processes involving trust, benign intent, and misun-
derstanding. Moreover, we suggest that such processes entail com-
munication, which includes self-presentation on the part of the
actor and attribution on the part of the observer (or partner).
Even in noise-free environments, self-presentation and attribu-
tion are very basic to understanding social interaction pro-
cesses, because behaviors in settings of interdependence can
often be guided by various goals and intentions (cf. Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978). For example, should a cooperative choice be
explained in terms of the motivation to enhance joint outcomes
or the motivation to enhance long-term personal outcomes?
Noise adds to the importance of self-presentation and attribu-
tion because it obscures the association between behavior and
intentions. For example, attributional tendencies toward ex-
plaining negative behavior in terms of negative intentions and
traits (e.g., Allison & Kerr, 1994; Reeder & Brewer, 1979) may
be quite costly if one considers their potential interpersonal
consequences—interpersonal misunderstanding and reduced
cooperation. Perhaps such interpersonal costs could be pre-
vented to some degree if the actors realize that there may be a
discrepancy between intended outcomes and actual outcomes
(i.e., that there is noise); that is, if actors are willing and able to
inhibit correspondent inferences or reserve judgment. As such,
the concept of noise can give rise to novel lines of future
research that might bring together social– cognitive activities,
with a focus on informational goals (self-presentation and at-
tribution), which may illuminate social interaction phenomena.
Second, there are also close links between noise and communi-
cation. Interpersonal communication may often serve to exchange
information about preferences relevant to pursuing interdepen-
dence opportunities and solving interdependence problems. For
example, two persons’ decision about where to have a vacation
may be partially determined by both persons’ preferences for
quality of culture, food, and climate. Clearly, informing one an-
other about such preferences is an important function of commu-
nication (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). A
second function of communication may be to discuss noise, espe-
cially because incidents of noise are typically known to the actor
but unknown to the partner (or at least not known with complete
confidence). Hence, individuals may explain discrepancies be-
tween intentions and actual behavior in an effort to prevent or
resolve misunderstanding and to promote cooperation and quality
of interaction outcomes (e.g., “I did not mean to hurt you”).
Research could address the benefits of communication (e.g., the
content, timing, and credibility of communication) in noisy social
dilemmas, which is likely to contribute to the classic discussion
about the functions of communication in social dilemmas (e.g.,
Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Orbell, Van de Kragt, & Dawes,
1988). A related topic for future research is noise as an excuse,
whereby individuals communicate noise to convey cooperative
intentions even if the intentions were not cooperative; that is, if
noise was absent (e.g., embellishing congestion on freeways as an
excuse for arriving late).
Third, as illustrated by some earlier examples, we assume that
noise plays a key role in ongoing interactions and relationships.
One of the most dangerous interaction patterns that challenge the
quality and future of a relationship is negative reciprocity, or
cycles of conflict (for evidence, see Gottman, 1994; Rusbult,
Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Prior research suggests
that individuals with low trust or commitment may be especially
prone to focus on a partner’s negative behavior and explain it in
terms of correspondingly negative intentions and traits, thereby
(perhaps unintentionally) contributing to a reality of distrust and
suspicion (e.g., Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Wieselquist, Rusbult,
Foster, & Agnew, 1999). We suggest that the atmosphere of
distrust may often be instigated and maintained by noise yet could
perhaps be overcome by giving the partner the benefit of the doubt
by behaving somewhat more generously. As such, the concept of
noise may enhance our understanding of why prorelationship
behavior such as acts of self-sacrifice and communal orientation
rather than exchange orientation tend to be associated with trust,
benign intent, and healthy functioning in relationships (e.g., Clark,
1984; Wieselquist et al., 1999). As such, coping with noise in ways
that are not detrimental to the quality or stability of a relationship
may well be one of the most challenging activities in the context
of ongoing relationships.
We close by outlining some avenues for future research. To
begin with, research on computer simulation tends to operate in
relative isolation of empirical research using real participants.
However, as we alluded to earlier, these approaches complement
each other in that they may inform each other about specific
models and hypotheses that can then be tested in both research
paradigms (for similar reasoning, see, e.g., Hastie & Stasser, 2000;
Messick & Liebrand, 1995). Also, computer simulations examine
computer–computer interaction (i.e., they involve interactions of
preprogrammed strategies), the present research examines
computer–participant interaction, and we hope that future re-
search will complement these approaches by examining
participant–participant interaction. For example, examining
participant–participant interaction may allow us to test hypoth-
eses regarding the intricate links between trust, noise, and
cooperation among partners who are involved in an ongoing
relationship. Further, we suggest that the concept of noise
enhances the ecological validity of research using experimental
games (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977); indeed, it is easy to generate
examples of noisy situations outside of the laboratory that lead
to interpersonal misunderstanding and noncooperative interac-
tion (e.g., “Why didn’t you respond to my E-mail?”). In this
regard, several aspects of noise (positive vs. negative noise,
noise frequency, noise intensity) deserve further attention.
Also, one might extend the present research to small groups,
which would allow one to explore whether group performance
is negatively influenced by the presence of noise and whether
generosity by one or more members may help overcome such
effects. As such, future research on social interaction, interper-
sonal relations, and group relations would benefit from greater
theoretical and empirical attention to situations in which acci-
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dents and incidental errors do occur, just as they occur and
shape interactions in everyday life.
Concluding Remarks
One cannot fully understand social interactions if one does not
consider the important fact from interpersonal life that intended
outcomes may sometimes be different from actual outcomes. In-
cidents of noise in social dilemmas give rise to misunderstanding
in that they may challenge benign impressions, thereby instigating
patterns of noncooperative rather than cooperative interaction. One
can overcome such detrimental effects of noise by behaving a little
bit more cooperatively than the partner did in a previous interac-
tion rather than by behaving in a strictly reciprocal manner. There-
fore, the recognition of noise in social interaction helps us under-
stand the interpersonal functions of generosity and why such
behavioral tendencies have survival value in interpersonal
relationships.
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